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Since the creation of the European Union, anti-immigration rhetoric 
has traditionally been directed at non-European citizens. However, in 
recent decades hostility towards migrants has been extended to the 
rejection of EU citizens, to whom the European treaties ostensibly 
guarantee freedom of movement. In particular, the migration of the 
largest European ethnic minority, the Roma, within the EU has been 
accompanied by inflamed media reports and populist discourse laden 
with explicitly racist sentiments. Whereas the dynamics of Romani 
migration in the original Member States has received substantial 
political and academic attention, the movement of Roma people 
across newer Member States continues to be overlooked. An intrinsic 
assumption that Romani migration is a solely westward phenomenon 
has led to a failure to examine the role of Central and Eastern 
European states in generating exclusionary policies. Despite urgent 
calls from human rights activists about the intensifying violation of the 
legal rights of Romani migrants the situation has yet to be 
acknowledged or scrutinized by international organizations and 
academics. To shed analytical light on this under-researched area, the 
article presents an analysis of the impact of Polish immigration regime 
on Romani migrants and long-time residents from Romania. Drawing 
on data from official documents, activist reports, and semi-structured 
interviews the article traces the neoliberalization of Polish migration 
regime: one that mobilizes aggressive attitudes and behaviors towards 
the poorest and most marginalized European citizens. In turn, it 
argues that the deterrent tactics employed against migrants by the 
Polish State has its roots in the increasingly restrictive EU immigration 
policies and economic determinism of the Freedom of Movement 
and Residency Directive. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The anti-immigration rhetoric in the EU, traditionally directed at non-EU 
citizens has now shifted towards the rejection of citizens, to whom the European 
treaties ostensibly guarantee freedom of movement. Particularly, migration of the 
largest European ethnic minority, the Roma, has been accompanied by inflamed 
media reports and populist discourse laden with explicitly racist sentiments. While 
Roma people represent a fraction of the many millions of European Citizens who 
move across state borders in their search for work, safety and a better life, national 
and local decision-makers perceive Roma migration as a threat to sovereign stability. 
While not all Roma people who exercise their rights to free movement are poor, state-
sponsored violence, subjugation and racialization disproportionally affect the most 
impoverished individuals and families.1 A study commissioned by the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) describes in detail the illegal 
surveillance of Roma migrants, forced evictions and ethnic profiling by state police 
forces (Cahn and Guild, 2010). According to the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) the criminalization of Roma migration has repeatedly 
served as an excuse to destroy Romani settlements as ‘cauldrons of criminality’ and to 
deport Roma people on the grounds of ethnicity (FRA, 2009). Legally dubious 
practices of collective deportations of Roma living in ‘informal’ encampments have 
taken place across the European Community (Severance, 2010; Parker, 2012; 
O’Nions, 2011; Fekete, 2011; Kóczé, 2017). These measures are fueled by public and 
media discourses that explicitly invoke ‘cultural difference’ as a basis for exclusion and 
banishment. The repressive treatment of Roma migrants by EU Member States 
derives its legitimacy from a historical and deeply entrenched Romanophobia 
(McGarry, 2017; Kóczé, 2017; Yildiz and De Genova, 2017; van Baar, 2017). 
Nevertheless, the zealous targeting of the most impoverished migrants must be placed 
at the center of the broader trend of welfare state retrenchment, punitive revamping of 
public policies and rebranding of poverty as personal failure (Wacquant, 2012). 
In recent years, scholarship on Roma migration shifted its analytical focus from 
examining the patterns and reasons for Roma migration (Vašečka and Vašečka, 2003; 
Guy, 2003) to addressing racialization, securitization and the criminalization of the 
abject socio-political conditions of Roma migrants (Kóché, 2017; Yildiz and De 
Genova, 2017; van Baar, 2017). The deportations of EU-national Roma migrants 
across the internal borders of the EU raise fundamental questions regarding the 
allegedly egalitarian and universalistic character of the freedom of movement regime 
(Humphris, 2017; Kóczé, 2017; Yildiz and De Genova, 2017; Aradau et al., 2013). 
Scholars argue that the European Union’s principle of ‘free movement’ has been 
perverted by national policies, mobilized to restrict the inflow of problematic and 
racialized EU nationals (Aradau et al., 2013; Yildiz and De Genova, 2017). While this 
novel line of research succeeds in placing the question of Roma migration at the                                                         
1 It is important to acknowledge that the Roma minority is an extremely diverse ethnic group and their 
experiences in the course of inner-European migration differ widely (Kropp and Striethorst, 2012). 
However, the cultural and economic diversity should not overshadow the unequivocal fact that the vast 
majority of Roma people ‘still belong to the poorest, most segregated, most discriminated against and 
least integrated populations in Europe, and their chances for socio-economic mobility continue to be 
extremely low’ (Sigona and Vermeersch, 2012: 1189). 
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center of normative debates about European citizenship, its analysis of the subjugation 
of Roma migrants often neglects the encroaching European trend towards repressive 
and coercive approaches to all people living in visible poverty. Although scholars do 
address the neoliberalization of ‘free movement’ in the EU (see: Kóczé, 2017; Yildiz 
and De Genova, 2017) they often do so only in relation to Roma migrants, thus failing 
to emphasize the vilification of impoverished mobility in general, which thrives under 
the EU regulations.     
Furthermore, scholarship on Roma mobility continues to focus primarily on 
developments unravelling in the original Member States under the intrinsic 
assumption that Roma migration is solely a westward phenomenon. The 
comparatively low mobility of Roma people within the Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) region has diminished interest to undertake critical analysis of immigration 
policies in countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, or Poland. While the 
recent ‘migration crisis’ brought international attention to xenophobic and hostile 
attitudes flourishing in the region, urgent calls of non-governmental organizations 
(NGO) and activists about appalling violations of human rights of Roma EU nationals 
continue to be ignored (Móricz, 2013; Nomada, 2013; 2014). Moreover, the focus on 
the deportations and evictions of Roma EU nationals rarely acknowledges that similar 
tactics are used to expel and penalize other impoverished groups and individuals. For 
example, in May 2016 the UK Home Office introduced new guidance stating that 
rough sleeping was an ‘abuse’ (later qualified as ‘misuse’) of EU citizens’ right of 
freedom of movement. The guidance means rough sleepers can now be 
‘administratively removed’ (effectively, deported) from the UK just for sleeping rough. 
This applies even if they are otherwise exercising treaty rights. Rough sleepers from 
Central and Eastern Europe have been particularly affected, but Italian and 
Portuguese nationals have also been detained and removed (Webber, 2017).  
Finally, the exclusion of the CEE region from a growing body of largely 
Western European research on migration hides the oppressive tactics mobilized by 
the CEE governments against impoverished migrants, including Roma people. It also 
fails to highlight the impact EU pressure has had on the deployment of restrictive 
immigration policies by the new Member States. Perhaps more importantly, 
scholarship on mobility rarely takes account of how neoliberal policies are now deeply 
entrenched and unchallenged in CEE region. In short, through the mobilization of 
racially charged disciplining measures to ‘protect’ social order and national unity, what 
escapes scrutiny, is the pernicious othering of all people living in poverty and 
justification of morally charged disciplining measures to ‘preserve’ social order and 
national unity. 
This article analyses the Polish immigration regime and its impact on 
Romanian Roma migrants residing in Poland. Building on data generated from official 
documents, activist reports and 15 semi-structured interviews with frontline workers, 
activists and Roma migrants, the article exposes a neoliberal approach to Polish 
migration policy: one which mobilizes aggressive attitudes and behaviors towards the 
poorest European citizens. It argues that the deterrent tactics employed against 
migrants by the Polish State has its roots in the increasingly restrictive EU immigration 
policies and economic determinism of the Freedom of Movement and Residency 
Directive. At the same time, the exogenous policies have met with little resistance 
since their deterring character fits with on-going neoliberalization of Polish society: a 
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process that replaces compassion and social justice with repression and 
individualization of poverty.  
 
2. Post-1989 developments in Polish immigration policy  
 
For more than a century, Poland has been one of the largest migrant-sending 
states in the CEE region and a vast reservoir of labor for many countries in Western 
Europe and North America. However, researchers began to predict that in the next 
decades Poland would gradually shift from being a major sending country to a country 
of transit migration and net immigration (Górny et al., 2009; Geddes and Scholten, 
2016). Poland as a fully-fledged EU member with a relatively stable economy (OECD, 
2016) provides vital opportunities for people from economically less developed 
countries in the region. Ukrainian migrants, in particular, choose Poland as a 
destination country, a pattern dictated as much by economic need and political 
instability as by strong historical ties between these two countries (Okólski, 2004). 
Nevertheless, despite the increase in overall immigration rates, in 2016, the foreign-
born population living in Poland reached only 1.6 per cent, the lowest percentage in 
the EU (Eurostat, 2016). According to the Office for Foreigners of the Polish Ministry 
of Interior, in 2014 there were 121,219 foreigners living in Poland legally (including 
registered EU nationals). There are no official data on the number of incoming or 
settled Roma migrants, as the government has made no attempt to analyze the legal 
and socio-economic circumstances of this group. According to activist research 
conducted by the Western Center for Social and Economic Research (ZOBSE) 
(Marcinkowski, 2015) there are around 1500 people who identify as Romanian Roma 
and live in informal encampments located on the outskirts of major Polish cities 
(including Warsaw, Wroclaw, Poznan, Cracow and Gdansk). Given these small 
numbers, immigration scholars continue to argue that Poland is mainly a transit 
country or a gateway to the West (Iglicka and Ziołek-Skrzypczak, 2010). Throughout 
the 1990s this widely held belief that most immigrants arriving in Poland are on their 
way somewhere else triggered little political or public concerns. Since WWII, the 
notion of ethnic homogeneity within Polish society – an idea crafted by the 
communist government – has such a grip on public understandings of ‘Polishness’ that 
it has resulted in an inability to see and discuss the changing dynamics of Polish 
demography.  
In the 1990s, the Polish State began to develop what would soon become one 
of the most restrictive immigration regimes in the region. Vermeersch (2005) reasons 
that this phenomenon was driven by the EU accession requirements and coercive 
pressure to install new ‘hard’ boarders on the Eastern and Southern frontier of the 
candidate States. Certainly, available research confirms that accession negotiations 
expedited a new tendency of Polish immigration policy towards the greater control 
and restriction of inflow (Stola, 2001; Vermeersch, 2005; Weinar, 2005; Łodziński 
and Szonert, 2016). In 1991, under the auspices of financial assistance from the EU 
(e.g. PHARE program), Poland concluded a readmission agreement with Germany, 
which bound Poland to re-admit third-country nationals who had illegally entered the 
Schengen area. The EU compensated Poland for each re-admitted ‘illegal’ immigrant 
and the acquired funds were quickly invested in border infrastructure and processing 
procedures (aimed at speeding up screenings and deportations). The Aliens Act of 
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1997 (amended in 2003) attached even stronger importance to deportations, 
militarization of border controls and the development of measures for combating 
illegal migration. Finally, as a prerequisite of accession, Poland introduced a new 
Schengen visa regime for a number of Eastern European countries, a decision that 
fully sealed off its Eastern border. In the context of a legislative framework focused on 
deterrence, little emphasis was placed on protection, integration or assistance to 
foreigners. Indeed, throughout the 1990s and 2000s, Poland neither defined 
integration in its legal documents nor devised any safeguarding mechanisms to succor 
migrants (Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010). As a senior Polish social worker 
commented, ‘in the 1990s, it was all about forcing people out, not about helping them 
adjust to the new surroundings’ (Interview, Poznan 2014). 
In 2004, as a fully-fledged member of the EU, Poland transposed the Freedom 
of Movement Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 29 April 2004 into its domestic legislation. The directive confers on every citizen of 
the Union a primary and individual right to move and reside freely within the territory 
of the Member States. However, as argued by Kóczé (2017) and van Baar (2017) free 
movement has been configured as a distinctly neoliberal project. While it opened the 
national economies to flows of capital and labor, it drastically curtailed the rights of 
‘less desirable populations’ to move around and settle in a place of their choice. For 
example, Article 12 introduced strict eligibility criteria for those who wished to register 
in the host country; these include proof of employment, self-employment, or financial 
self-sufficiency, and possession of valid health insurance. While the directive talks 
about non-discrimination (Art. 20), social cohesion and integration (Art. 18, 19) it 
reserves free movement for active workers and wealthy elites who do not rely on social 
support. Article 16 articulates this bluntly by stating that it is possible to expel people 
who ‘become an unreasonable burden on the social assistance’. Prompted by EU 
pressure, the Polish authorities took Article 12 to the extreme, applying a sufficient 
resources test to all registering citizens of the Union, and demanding proof of 
permanent address (§2, Law Journal, No. 217, item 1616). A senior public servant 
explained that under center-right government led by Civic Platform (PO) the Office of 
Interior was determined to ‘play up to the EU demands by adopting the strictest 
stance possible on unregistered migration’ (Interview Warsaw 2014). Those unable to 
meet these criteria were pushed into ‘informal’ residency. In this way, as argued by 
Aradau et al., (2013) free movement becomes less about provision of opportunities 
and more about enabling exploitation (e.g. in the labor market) and precarious living 
conditions (e.g. no access to adequate housing or healthcare). 
 
3. Creating the ‘other’  
 
While the creation of restrictive and economically deterministic immigration 
regime has been influenced by exogenous (EU) pressures (Vermeersch, 2005), its 
consolidation corresponded with the triumph of neoliberal forces, a broad rubric that 
includes a host of offensives against human dignity: poverty, exclusion and social 
inequalities ranging from racism to gender inequalities. The transition to a free market 
economy in 1989 had resulted in staggering polarization of Polish society. According 
to research, within a decade Polish disparity of income became one of the highest in 
CEE. When measured by Gini coefficient, between 1987 and 1997, inequality 
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increased from 0.26 to 0.334. Between 1988 and 2000, the percentage of people living 
in extreme poverty (defined as those who go to bed hungry) increased from 1.5 to 6.7 
(Domański, 2002). By 2015, 7.4 per cent of the population lived in extreme poverty 
with an income of less than 545PLN (€131) per month. Another 16.2 per cent lived in 
relative poverty, with the income of a family of four less than 2056PLN (€496) per 
month (GUS, 2016). The on-going political and spatial separation of the poor brought 
about the relatively new phenomena of homelessness and a bourgeoning post-
communist underclass. Amid the striking changes in the nature and shape of poverty, 
radical exclusion became the new order of the day with Beskid (1998: 42) 
commenting that ‘set against all the other countries of CEE Poland is pursuing the 
most elitist model of income distribution.’ 
The painful effects of the market-economy transition on large sections of the 
population were made acceptable by presenting them as a matter of national pride 
and national security. This not only delegitimized the demands of the losers of the 
transformation but also pushed poverty into the realm of the private. The idea that 
social advancement is possibly through individual action – productivity and 
entrepreneurship – gain the status of a gospel effectively labelling the poor and 
unemployed people as lazy and feckless, not deserving to benefit from civic and 
human rights (Bobako, 2010). The engineer of shock therapy, Leszek Balcerowicz, 
went as far as equating non-productivity with plunder and war, a phenomenon he 
presented as a threat to national security (Gazeta Wyborcza, 2008). In a relatively 
short period of time, the Polish ruling elites, supported by mass media, constructed 
profit as the essence of democracy and consumption as the most valuable act of 
citizenship (Sowa, 2010). This not only justified aggressive privatization of public 
assets (including housing stock and healthcare services) but also individualized social 
inequalities. 
According to Zygmunt Bauman, subordination of equity values to commercial 
interests creates the conditions for ‘the suspicion against others, the intolerance of 
difference, the resentment of strangers and the demands to separate and banish them’ 
(1998: 47). Development of restrictive immigration regime in Poland and deployment 
of punitive policies targeted at the poor (evictions of problematic tenants, benefit cuts 
for delinquent individuals, removal of children from shiftless parents, imposition of 
fines for panhandling and rough sleeping)2 reflects this dynamic. The aim is to 
ostracize and push out of the public view those ‘unwilling’ to contribute to economic 
growth and those rejecting the sanctity of entrepreneurial logic. Specific if not unique 
to the Polish realization of the neoliberal project, was eradication of the discourse of 
‘class exploitation’ and the discreditation of socialist postulates (Żuk, 2010). As none 
of the leading parties were able to eliminate growing dissatisfaction arising from 
economic developments, politicians began to direct these negative emotions against 
‘the enemies’ of the Polish State – including the ‘foreigners’ (anybody who did not fit 
the model of a Polish-Catholic) (Ost, 2007). These tactics proved beneficial to the 
ruling elites as the victims of transition ceased to attack the economic system and 
turned their frustration towards culturally defined ‘others’. The rampant ‘othering’ of 
poor people not only legitimized on-going cuts to social services and policing those                                                         
2 Under the Penal Code, bathing in forbidden areas, begging and the fouling and littering of public places 
are all subject to fines. In addition, trespass is a criminal offence subject to a fine or imprisonment of up 
to one year (Dz.U. 2010, No. 46, item 275).  
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deemed ‘unproductive’ but also gave rise to rampant xenophobic and explicitly racist 
attitudes, which reached the pinnacle during the latest ‘migration crisis’. As argued by 
Charkiewicz (2009) the inflamed public opinion no longer limits itself to vilifying the 
poor but calls for their ‘extermination’. The new central question of Polish politics is 
thus concerned with who has a right to live and who does not.  
It is in this hostile context that the article will now discuss the situation and 
treatment of Romanian Roma migrants residing in Poland.  
 
4. Romanian Roma in Poland – invisible tyranny  
 
It is still common to consider the presence of Romanian Roma in Poland as a 
new phenomenon related to the accession of Romania into the EU in 2007. However, 
Roma migration to Poland (and across Europe) had already commenced in the 1990s, 
when Roma people from the Eastern European block began to flee abject poverty and 
increasing levels of ethnic violence in their home countries (Bhabha et al., 2017). 
Although Poland often served as a stop off point towards the West (for Roma people 
from Romania, Bulgaria, and ex-Yugoslavia), many families stayed behind and settled 
in various parts of Poland. This effectively means that Romanian Roma migrants have 
been living in Poland for over 20 years, often in absolute poverty, exclusion and under 
constant threat of violence (Nomada, 2014). There is no data on the number of Roma 
migrants arriving in Poland in the 1990s and little systematic knowledge on why some 
people decided to stay. Interviews conducted by the author point to many reasons, 
including not enough funds to travel further, personal and health issues preventing 
further migration, or ‘being sent back by German authorities’, (Interviews, Wroclaw 
and Poznan, 2013).  
In the beginning the arrival of Romanian Roma people did not meet with 
severe hostility although it would be an overstatement to claim that migrants were well 
received. As remembered by a social worker from Poznan, ‘people felt pity for them, 
we were not accustomed to such poverty, entire families sleeping on the pavement that 
was new, some people helped a bit but most just pretended not to see’ (Interview, 
Poznan, 2014). In interviews, Roma themselves insist that in the beginning ‘people 
were nice, not so angry’ (Interview, Poznan, 2013). However, there are no studies 
documenting attitudes of Poles towards incoming Roma migrants in the early 1990s, 
hence these statements need to be treated with caution. Nonetheless, absence of 
inflammatory reports in the press during those times does show that the moral panic 
around Roma arrivals developed later on. The new arrivals could not however, count 
on any support from the State undergoing ‘shock therapy’ and the drastic curtailment 
of public provisions. In multiple ways, for more than a decade Romanian Roma lived 
‘stateless lives’ fully excluded from basic citizenship rights and access to the most 
essential public services (including education, healthcare and housing). For example, 
activist research shows that Romani children born in the Polish territory are often not 
recognized as rightful citizens or residents, and do not have access to basic education. 
Between 2011 and 2013 in Wroclaw, none of the children age 6 to 16 were enrolled 
in school or any other form of education (Nomada, 2014). Without valid documents 
Roma are forced to squat in makeshift houses without basic amenities, living off 
panhandling and informal scrap-collection (Marcinkowski, 2015). 
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The development of a restrictive immigration regime, under the auspices of the 
EU, predictably brought new attention to the presence of Romanian Roma people. 
Under a growing international pressure to fight ‘illegal immigration’, the Polish State 
was determined to show that the money invested by the EU was well spent and that 
order was being maintained. Hence, the first official policy towards Roma migrants 
who overstayed their visa permits was that of eviction and ‘on-the-spot’ deportation. 
Yet, the legality of these actions was neither monitored nor documented and currently 
there are no reliable or accessible public records accounting for the exact number of 
deportations.3 According to the Ministry of Interior all deportations were executed in 
line with the Polish law of that time, however, activist reports stress that they were 
rarely supported by court decisions and often entire communities were purposely 
misled about their rights (Nomada, 2013; Marcinkowski and Rusakiewicz, 2015). 
Perhaps the most violent and legally dubious deportation took place in Wroclaw in 
1998. According to the news report (Gazeta Wyborcza, 1998), on 15th October at 6 
am the riot police and border guards converged on the Romanian Roma informal 
encampment in Tarnogaj (district of Wroclaw). Around one hundred people, 
including small children, where rounded up and forced onto the buses, with no prior 
notice. In what was called ‘Operation Alien’ (Operacja Obcy), the county police, in 
full riot gear and rubber gloves, began to demolish the settlement using iron bars and 
sledgehammers. The residents were transported to the border guard unit in Kłodzko, 
where they were placed in the gymnasium and deported the same day. In an interview, 
colonel Lech Surówka, a spokesman for the Commander of the Sudeten Border 
Guard, stated that the demolition of the settlement took place according to ‘protocol’. 
When asked why such drastic measures were employed, he explained: ‘[there is] no 
point of leaving them here, the winter is coming, begging will stop, and theft will begin’ 
(Gazeta Wyborcza, 1998). Similar operations took place in Poznan (1993, 1999) 
Warsaw (1996 and 1998) and Cracow (1996) (Marcinkowski and Rusakiewicz, 2015). 
According to a witness, a well-known Polish anthropologist J. Fickowski, many of 
these operations resembled roundups common during WWII, ‘it was disinfestation, 
not a normal way to treat people’ (Gazeta Wyborcza, 1996). And yet, the violent and 
discriminatory treatment of Roma migrants by the Polish State has never been 
exposed or reprimanded. Indeed, these mass deportations have entered a canon of 
‘forgotten history’, fervently denied by the authorities.  
Not surprisingly a coping strategy adopted by many Romanian Roma families 
has been that of invisibility – avoidance of all contact with the authorities and any form 
of institutionalized assistance. Roma families have found shelter in the most secluded 
places (often close to landfills or on post-industrial sites); ready to relocate at any 
moment, with interfamily networks serving as the immediate safety net and 
information channels. Papadopoulos et al., (2008) argued that becoming 
imperceptible is often the most effective tool that a marginal population can employ to 
oppose prevailing forms of state violence. Certainly, in the case of Romanian Roma 
invisibility proved an effective strategy of evasion, as the topic of Romani migrants                                                         
3 There are many media reports of evictions and deportations that took place in large Polish cities; 
however, the government has never released any official report or statement to the public. This also 
applies to deportations of immigrants from ex-Soviet republics who tried to settle in Poland throughout 
the 1990s. The Ministry of Interior refused to grant access to the archival documents to the author of this 
article.   
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disappeared from the State’s agenda for more than a decade. As the resources were 
concentrated on securing Eastern borders, the authorities turned a blind eye to the 
growing destitution of ‘transit migrants’ in hopes that sooner or later the unwelcome 
guests would leave on their own. 
 
5. New status, same treatment  
 
The accession of Romania to the EU in 2007 granted the Romanian Roma 
people EU citizenship, which under the Freedom of Movement Directive protects 
them from deportations and discrimination based on ethnicity and nationality. 
However, this newfound status has proved of little benefit and paradoxically only 
further excluded Roma migrants from socio-economic life and access to public 
services. Under a restrictive and economically driven legal framework, the 
impoverished Romanian Roma communities found it almost impossible to register as 
EU citizens often finding themselves in a limbo of bureaucratic protocol. According to 
the Commissioner for Human Rights (2014), the local authorities tend to ignore 
problematic cases (i.e. expired documents, lack of permanent address) hiding behind 
eligibility criteria and ignoring the dramatic socio-economic exclusion of long-term 
residents. Roma migrants cannot count on well-informed assistance and their cases are 
often reviewed in an ad-hoc manner – often dependent on the good will of individual 
agencies and/or bureaucrats. Moreover, while Poland has transposed all the articles of 
the Directive 2004/38/EC, it did not systematize procedural protocol and harmonize 
the EU requirements with the existing legal provisions and institutional modus 
operandi. The effect is one of confusion, procedural inconsistencies and limited 
knowledge about the proper course of action. This is particularly acute at the lower 
tiers of government (Duszczyk and Lesińska, 2009). These factors generate an evasive 
attitude among public administrators and front-line workers who are not always certain 
about their own decision-making discretion and are excessively constrained by 
byzantine protocol. In fact, it is still common for bureaucrats to label Romanian Roma 
as illegal immigrants excluding them from available programs (i.e. registration as 
unemployed). 
In instances where Roma migrants do manage to register they cannot access 
quality social assistance. Rigid interpretation of the Freedom of Movement Directive is 
based on the premise that EU citizens are economically self-sufficient and in no need 
of state support. Hence, the Polish government does not prioritize integration of 
foreigners and has yet to pass proper legislation. The first timid step towards strategic 
thinking about integration took place in 2011, when the Working Group operating 
within the inter-ministry Team for Migration presented a document titled The Polish 
Migration Policy: Its Current State and Further Actions. The strategy outlined the 
main lines of action around integration, however its scope was extremely limited, as it 
did not discuss issues such as access to public healthcare, education and social 
housing. Paradoxically, the strategy was directed exclusively at foreigners who 
‘integrate easily into local communities’ such as international students or recruited 
professionals (Duszczyk and Góra, 2012). The explicit disregard for the presence and 
needs of impoverished and irregular migrants is a striking example of the neoliberal 
drive to revoke the rights to residency (and citizenship) for migrants believed 
‘undeserving’ or ‘culturally incompatible’. In fact, the strategy bluntly states that 
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foreigners should not perceive integration programs through the prism of the 
provision of social benefits. Statistics on the use of social security instruments confirm 
that the share of foreigners is marginal (Duszczyk and Góra, 2012). Thus, it is ironic 
that the current discourse presents poor migrants as welfare tourists, who live of social 
support and exploit the charity of ‘good Samaritans’. 
The explicit rejection of integration policy as a means to provide foreigners with 
adequate public assistance is further manifested in the way the Polish integration 
regime is institutionalized. Discretion and responsibilities for integration are scattered 
across different ministries and departments that tend to work in silos and often neither 
have a clear mandate for action nor prioritize integration in their portfolios. While the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Policy handles assistance programs, it is the Ministry of 
the Interior and Administration that is accountable for issues pertaining to visa policy, 
granting of the right to remain and for actions targeted at refugees. The analyses show 
that no direct relationship between these two parts is stipulated by Polish legislation; 
hence immigration policy is purposefully disconnected (Duszczyk and Góra, 2012). 
This means that opening of the Polish labor market to foreign workers is not 
accompanied by decisions concerning their inclusion into Polish society. The 
migration policy doctrine assumes the primacy of labor market needs (i.e. 
replenishment of emerging labor force shortages) with disregard of issues related to 
equality, social justice and individual well-being. Moreover, the cultural turn in public 
discourse legitimates inaction on integration by fueling ‘smear campaigns’ against 
impoverished migrants. The analysis conducted by the Center for Social Opinion 
Survey (CBOS) in October 2015, shows that only six per cent of Polish internet users 
commenting on migration spoke out in favor of helping immigrants integrate into 
Polish society. 
Consolidation of anti-poverty rhetoric and normalization of xenophobic 
attitudes brought Romanian Roma migrants into the spotlight. Their visible poverty 
added a new impetus to long-standing prejudices towards indigenous Roma 
communities and the so-called ‘losers of the transition’. The prevailing attitudes 
portray Roma communities as a locus of uneducated, culturally backward and lazy 
people, predisposed to criminality and exploitation of social benefits and charity hand-
outs. Under neoliberal governance a powerful consensus emerged that Roma people 
are socialized within a ‘culture of worklessness’ and actively disregard Polish norms 
and customs (thus threatening social order). This portrayal is evident in media 
headlines, such as those published by the largest daily paper of Lower Silesia ‘Gypsies 
attack people in the old square’, ‘The Gypsies grope passing women. How to protect 
yourself’, ‘Roma are not poor they know how to lie and steal’ (Kozioł, 2014). The 
image of an aggressive panhandler (amassing great fortunes by ‘swindling the hard-
working people’) effectively hid structural dimensions of poverty and normalized 
institutionalized racism. A blunt statement from a manager of a social work team in 
Wroclaw shows the dramatic lack of understanding of the real barriers to integration 
and functioning in the society: ‘they come and go, they don’t want to work, or send 
their children to school, it is not possible to work with them, they lie; but worst of all 
they force children to beg’ (Interview, Wroclaw, 2013). 
The pervasive trend of seeking the cause of poverty and justification for policy 
failures in the community itself and its specific culture further legitimized deployment 
of conservative, morally charged and penalizing interventions. While some localities 
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rely on less coercive schemes than others, the effect is always the same – a gruesome 
violation of human rights, inconsistent application of the law and systemic abjection of 
entire communities. 
 
6. Public policy of stigma  
 
The treatment of Romanian Roma fully exposes the penalizing nature of the 
Polish neoliberal regime and its insidious drive to stigmatize destitution. Inside 
institutionalized hostilities, social workers as well as community development 
practitioners and integration experts appear complicit in implementing social policies 
that are degrading and inhumane. Interventions are dispatched in an ad-hoc manner, 
usually as a reaction to a publicized ‘crisis’ i.e. inflammatory media reports, epidemic 
scares and complaints. They also have a schizophrenic character, on one hand 
espousing basic humanitarian principles and on the other authoritarian moralities (e.g. 
surveillance, eviction, removal of children). This is best illustrated in the city of 
Wroclaw, where after agreeing to provide the informal Roma encampment on 
Kamieńskiego Street with portable toilets, garbage disposal units and water tanks the 
authorities unleashed an array of intimidation tactics, including unscheduled controls 
by the City Guard and police, random public health inspections and early-morning 
visits by social workers. According to the Roma residents, visitors to the camp always 
demanded detailed information about the families, conducted illegal searches of the 
houses, and insisted that a failure to comply with their instructions, could result in 
children being removed (Nomada, 2014). These kinds of actions and threats are 
extremely common and are used to exert pressure of the most painful kind as a social 
lever to secure acquiescence.  
Direct harassment has been complemented with morally charged antipoverty 
campaigns aimed at changing the problematic behavior of unproductive individuals 
rather than promoting wider structural adjustments and reforms. One such oppressive 
strategy, mobilized under the auspices of eradicating anti-social behavior, is 
stigmatization and penalization of street begging. Anti-begging campaigns appeared in 
the late 2000s, as a means of tackling the allegedly increasing problem of ‘aggressive’ 
begging and to discourage members of the public from giving money to beggars 
(Fertsch and Roik, 2011). Publicly funded posters, brochures and fliers circulated in 
Polish cities with slogans such as, Don’t Give Money on the Street, Help for Real, 
Begging is a choice not a necessity. While local councils maintained that this 
deliberately ‘hard-hitting’ campaign was not anti-Roma, they admitted that a lack of 
street donations will force the Roma people (as well as other homeless people) to 
relocate. As stated by the MP representing the city Bydgoszcz, ‘if we cut them off, they 
will have to leave’ (Phone Interview, Bydgoszcz, 2017). In a strict sense, mendicancy is 
not illegal in Poland (the regulation prohibits the aggressive and fraudulent extortion 
of money, and begging performed by minors),4 however, it lends itself to public 
outcries driven by an omnipresent stereotype of a begging Gypsy, too lazy to do 
anything else, and flamboyant tabloid stories of tremendous wealth accumulated by 
scrounging Roma. In 2013, the popular internet portal trojmiasto.pl published a story 
about Romanian Roma beggars in the city of Gdansk under the title Gdansk attracts                                                         
4 Code of Administrative Offences, Article 58.  
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beggars, they ‘earn’ thousands of zloty per day. In an interview, a manager of the social 
work unit Monika Ostrowska insisted: ‘They [Roma] are very clever and have 
developed methods of begging to perfection. Recently, children begged with a small 
dog. It arouses pity. Please do not be fooled by their poverty.’ 
The campaigns are often reinforced with control checks, issuing of fines and 
the confiscation of money. While under the Polish Petty Offenses Act (Penal Code), a 
person can only be fined if she or he is able to work or has enough resources to live 
independently, the law does not provide a definition of the level of resources deemed 
to be ‘enough to live independently’ nor of an ‘importunate or fraudulent manner’. 
The police are therefore able to decide at their discretion whether to charge someone 
with an offense or ask the person to leave the area. Far from being effective the 
campaigns reinforce social stigma by implying that beggars are engaged in criminal 
activities and that they have other choices for generating income. It is not coincidental 
that instances of verbal abuse and harassment of Romanian Roma increased shortly 
after the campaigns took to the streets. As a mother of three children confessed, ‘it 
was always bad, but now it is very very bad, people spit on you, and call you names, 
but I need to sit, I need to buy food for my children’ (Interview, Poznan, 2014). 
Stigmatization of begging has been complimented by measures that interdicted 
all forms of public ‘loitering’ and took a hard stance on squatting and rough sleeping 
(Browarczyk, 2013). Growing income inequalities and rampant privatization of social 
housing has left a growing number of people without a secured abode. In line with the 
neoliberal drive to secure the interests of corporate elites (in this case housing 
developers), the state’s response to squatting was forceful evictions, issuing of fines for 
‘trespassing’ and legal prosecutions. Since the majority of Romanian Roma live in 
informal encampments often located on vacant public land, they too became victims 
of these measures. To legitimize on-going expulsions, often undertaken without clear 
legal mandate and with no alternative housing provided, the local authorities labelled 
Roma communities as illegal ghettos, places of crime that breed a parasitical 
dysfunctional underclass. The policy of clearing the city of undesirable elements, 
forced many Romanian Roma to subsist in what Tyler (2013) calls ‘degraded border 
zones within the state’. The evicted families not only lost all their belongings but also 
filial networks of friendship, care and protection. Their faith and trust in the State and 
state actors, already very fragile, was tarnished completely, and the new generation of 
EU nationals was pushed further into extreme exclusion. 
The most well-known legal intervention took place in the city Wroclaw in 2012, 
when the Mayor’s Office pronounced the encampment on Kamieńskiego Street as 
illegal, dangerous and a risk to public health (opinion issued by the Sanitary 
Inspectorate prior to any investigation). On March 19th, 2012, the City tried to 
demolish the camp and remove its residents with the help from municipal police. The 
authorities eventually abandoned the action due to an unclear legal mandate and 
conflict about who should bear responsibility for the eviction. Although the incident 
showed that municipalities are not in possession of legal policy tools to address 
‘informal housing’, it did not prevent the City Hall from conceiving alternative ways of 
eradicating the encampment (Nomada, 2014). On the 26th of March 2013, the 
residents received an official notice to vacate the premises within two weeks. On the 
18th of April 2013, the city filed a lawsuit for eviction of 47 adults and children in the 
District Court in Wroclaw. 
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The Kamieńskiego case, widely covered in the media, set in motion a series of 
evictions and dubious legal prosecutions across Poland. In 2013, a Roma family living 
in Poznan was evicted from an abandoned building, under the decision of the County 
Inspectorate of Construction, which deemed the dwelling unsafe.5 Yet, the family (with 
children under five) was not provided with alternative housing (required by the Polish 
law) or any form of social assistance. The authorities insisted that the family was given 
an option to move into a homeless shelter but refused. Given that shelters in Poland 
are segregated by gender it should not be surprising that the family refused to live 
there, instead relocating to another informal camp located on an abandoned 
allotment. In 2014, local authorities in Gdansk allowed for the demolition of a three-
year-old encampment in Jelitkowo, without providing legal notice (required by the 
Polish law) and without the knowledge of the Municipal Family Support Center. 
Under pressure from human rights activists, the Vice Mayor of Gdansk admitted that 
the demolition took place ‘a bit too early’, due to a breakdown in communication 
channels among the City Hall, City Guard and Social Services. Even though 30 
people (including children) lost all their possessions and became homeless, the 
decision was not condemned by the Prosecutor’s Office and no alternative housing 
was provided. In 2015, a small camp on Paprotna Street in Wroclaw, the home of an 
extended Roma family, was ‘cleaned’ and ‘cleared’ by the workers of the City Guard 
and Urban Greenery Unit. When questioned by activists about the decision, the 
Mayor’s Office insisted that the warrant for clearing was issued by the District 
Inspectorate, an autonomous public agency, hence avoiding legal responsibility. In a 
meeting with an activist, the legal advisor of the Mayor’s Office insisted that the area 
was ‘unoccupied’. This is a blunt fabrication as the camp had been under continued 
police surveillance and its residents were regularly visited by the municipal social work 
unit. Less publicized evictions took place in Warsaw and Cracow, where entire 
families were evicted from vacant abodes once again without any assistance provided. 
According to the Polish law local authorities are required to provide shelter and 
support to homeless people and people who are evicted (Journal of Laws of 15 April 
2004, No. 64, Item 593). However, this assistance is often based on ‘behavioral 
control’, which gives officials and care workers complete power over the clients. For 
example, in 2014 Municipal Social Work Unit moved a Romanian Roma family from 
the encampment on Kaminskiego Street to a social center under its authority. The 
center subjected the family to daily controls (including room searches), 24-hour 
monitoring, evening curfew and limited visitation rights. The social workers also 
endorsed a no tolerance begging policy, which meant that any instance of 
noncompliance would result in immediate expulsion. Although the family was 
provided with food and basic personal items (i.e. sanitary products), it did not receive 
any financial assistance, as it was deemed that the Roma would spend the money on 
‘cigarettes’ and ‘junk food’. In meetings with local NGOs, social workers insisted that 
such control measures were necessary to ‘prepare and teach Roma how to lead a 
proper life’. In effect, the ‘assistance’ stripped the family of the ability to act, prevented 
them from influencing their own life, and assuming responsibility for their behavior. 
Human rights advocates compared the center to a corrective institution that not only                                                         
5 The request for public disclosure of the assessment report, delivered to the authorities by the County 
Inspectorate of Construction, was denied (last request was made by the author on July 5. 2017).  
 182  JOANNA KOSTKA 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 4(2): 169-188. 
hides poverty from the public view, but also humiliates and further disenfranchises 
people. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks  
 
The discrimination against Roma migrants living in Poland is still a severely 
underreported reality. This article conveys that for two decades the Polish State has 
endorsed an array of oppressive and violent approaches, which has pushed Roma 
migrants into abject poverty and destitution. Throughout the 1990s the dismal 
circumstances of this ethnic minority and their persecution have gone fully unnoticed 
by international organizations, domestic human rights institutions and NGOs. 
Paradoxically, the transposition of the Freedom of Movement Directive contributed to 
further exclusion and stigmatization of Roma migrants who have been living in Poland 
for more than a decade. The continuing disenfranchisement of this group shows that 
European citizenship does not by any means make the EU a fully inclusive society of 
equal citizens. In fact, the very design of the Directive unjustifiably disadvantages the 
poorest migrants, as it allows Member States to discriminate against economically 
inactive European Union citizens labelled as an ‘unreasonable burden on the social 
assistance’. In its current form, free movement within the EU provides unprecedented 
opportunities for 500 million citizens to live in each other’s countries, but it is tied to a 
violent and oppressive system of exclusion. The ‘differential treatment’ has allowed 
the right-wing government of Poland to make the cynical, opportunistic argument for 
reconsideration of the benefits of the principle of free movement and rolled out 
punitive interventions aimed at deterring impoverished migrants from settling down 
and gaining access to civic and social rights.  
The dismal response of the Polish State to integration challenges must be 
considered within a wider neoliberal attack on the social contract: one, which destroys 
existing systems of wealth redistribution and dismantles all forms of social provision. 
Central to this neoliberal ideology is the claim that the management and development 
of all aspects of society should be left to the wisdom of the market (Harvey, 2005). As 
the exchange of capital takes precedence over social justice, public policies aimed at 
elevating societal inequalities (particularly those based on race, gender and class) are 
dissolved in favor of what Giroux (2004) calls ‘chronic punishment’. He argues that 
the facets of public space are becoming militarized in order to secure the privileges 
and benefits of the corporate elites. In turn, Bauman reminds us that the elimination 
of common goods provides fertile grounds for politics of intolerance and the 
‘hysterical, paranoiac concern with law and order’ (1998: 47). Laws, regulations and 
administrative measures thus concurrently discipline the poorest strata of society and 
racialize the ‘other’, to reduce the visibility of poverty and hide it as social issue. In this 
political landscape, violent expulsions and criminalization of migrants, particularly 
those living in ‘visible poverty’ (e.g. squatters, rough sleepers and panhandlers) serve 
to appease growing public insecurities while relieving the state of responsibilities for 
upholding the human rights of all its residents.  
In this context, political decisions have a central role in determining what Polish 
society will look like over the next few decades, how inclusive it will be, and whose 
economic, social and political rights will be taken into account. The fact that Poland is 
still not receiving a high volume of immigrants should prompt the authorities to use 
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this time to devise integration policies and experiment with progressive approaches 
based on the principles of social justice. However, at the moment the picture looks 
grim, especially considering the on-going militarization of European borders and full 
endorsement of deterrent tactics by the EU. The criminalization of begging and 
squatting are the tip of an ugly iceberg of a wide base of antisocial behavior measures 
that are used to punish or fine people in the name of disrupting public order and 
measures that police the use of public space by people considered ‘undesirable’ by 
policymakers and business owners. As the European Commissioner for Human 
Rights, Nils Muižnieks (2015) has said, ‘the criminalization of poverty hides problems 
from the public view and undermines efforts to improve the living conditions of Roma 
[and others] who are stigmatized and discriminated against.’ While the resistance to 
migrants in some Polish cities is beginning to thaw, mostly because of grassroots 
advocacy, there is still no conception of how to alter and/or adjust existing procedures 
to promote a long-term, legitimate and accountable integration process. This will 
continue to prove a great challenge for many years to come unless we ensure that 
public spaces, public infrastructure and social assistance, is accessible to everyone – 




Aradau, C., Huysmans, J., Macioti, P. G. and Squire, V. (2013) Mobility Interrogating 
Free Movement? Roma Acts of European Citizenship. In Isin, E. and Saward, 
M. (eds.) Enacting European Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 132-154. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9781139524025.008 
Beskid, L. (1998) Sytuacja Materialna Gospodarstw Domowych (English: The 
Financial Situation of Households). Warsaw: IFiS.  
Bhabha, J., Mirga, A. and Matache, M. (eds.) (2017) Realizing Roma Rights. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.9783/9780812293876  
Bobako, M. (2010) Konstruowanie Odmienności Klasowej Jako Urasowianie. 
Przypadek Polski po 1989 Roku. (English: Formulating Class Differences as 
Racializing. Case: Poland After 1989. In Żuk, P. (ed.) Podziały Klasowe i 
Nierówności Społeczne (English: Class Divisions and Social Inequalities). 
Warsaw, Oficyna Naukowa. 165-181 
Cahn, C. and Guild, E. (2010) Recent Migration of Roma in Europe. 
Warsaw: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 
Charkiewicz, E. (2009) Matki do Sterylizacji. Neoliberalny Rasizm w Polsce (English: 
Sterilize the Mothers. Neoliberal Racism in Poland). Lewica.pl. Available 
at: http://www.lewica.pl/?id=16421 Accessed: 12/06/2018   
Centrum Badania Opini Społecznej (English: Center for Social Opinion Survey) 
(2015) Polacy Wobec Problemu Uchodźstwa (English: Attitudes of Poles 
Towards Refugees). Warsaw, June 2015. Available 
at: http://www.cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2015/K_081_15.PDF Accessed: 
20/07/2017 
 184  JOANNA KOSTKA 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 4(2): 169-188. 
Council of Europe (2012) Human Rights of Roma and Travellers in Europe. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing. 
Commissioner for Human Rights (2014) Sytuacja Romów we Wrocławiu (English: 
Situation of the Roma in Wroclaw). Warsaw: RPO Office. Available 
at: https://www.rpo.gov.pl/pl/content/sytuacja-rom%C3%B3w-we-
wroc%C5%82awiu Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Domański, H. (2002) Polska Klasa Średnia. (English: Polish Middle Class). Wroclaw: 
Fundacja na Rzecz Nauki Polskiej (English: Foundation for Polish Science). 
Duszczyk, M. and Lesińska, M. (eds.) (2009) Współczesne Migracje: Dylematy 
Europy i Polski (English: Contemporary Migration: European and Polish 
Dilemmas). Warsaw: Ośrodek Badań nad Migracjami (English: Center for 
Migration Research). 
European Commission (2008) Discrimination in the EU: Perceptions, Experiences 
and Attitudes. Special Eurobarometer 296. Available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_296_en.pdf Accessed: 
20/07/2017 




European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2009) The Situation of Roma-EU-
Citizens Moving to and Settling in Other EU-Member-States. Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. Available 
at: http://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2010/situation-roma-eu-citizens-moving-
and-settling-other-eu-member-states Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Fekete, L. (2011) Accelerated Removals: The Human Cost of EU Deportation 
Policies. Race and Class, 52(4): 89-97.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396810396605 
Fertsch, K. and Roik, M. (2011) Kampania Przeciwko Żebractwu w Poznaniu 
(English: Anti-Begging Campaign in Poznan). Poznan: Wiadomości Nasze 
Miasto. Available at: http://poznan.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/kampania-przeciw-
zebractwu-w-poznaniu,985619,art,t,id,tm.html Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Gazeta Wyborcza (1998) Najazd Na Obozowisko Rumuńskich Cyganów (English: An 
Invasion of the Romanian Roma Camp). Nr. 243. Published on 16/10/1998. 





 NO COUNTRY FOR POOR PEOPLE 185 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 4(2): 169-188. 
Gazeta Wyborcza (1996) Czy Likwidacja Koczowiska Cygańskiego Była Potrzebna? 
(English: Was the Liquidation of the Romanian Roma Camp Necessary?) Nr. 




Geddes, A. and Scholten, P. (2016) The Politics of Migration and Immigration in 
Europe, 2nd Edition. London: Sage Publications Ltd. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.4135/9781473982703 
Górny, A., Grabowska-Lusińska, I., Lesińska, M. and Okólski, M. (2009) Poland: 
Becoming a Country of Sustained Immigration. IDEA Working Paper No. 10, 
Warsaw: Centre of Migration Research University of Warsaw.   
Hall, D. and Mikulska-Jolles, A. (2016) Uprzedzenia, Strach Czy Niewiedza? Młodzi 
Polacy o Powodach Niechęci do Przyjmowania Uchodźców (English: Prejudice, Fear 
or Lack of Knowledge? Young Poles Talk about Reasons for their Negative Attitudes 
towards Refugees). Warsaw: Stowarzyszenie Interwencji Prawnej (English: Association 
for Legal Intervention). 
Harvey, D. (2005) A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Humphris, R. (2017) On the Threshold: Becoming Romanian Roma, Everyday 
Racism and Residency Rights in Transition. Social Identities, 24(4): 505-519. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1335831 
Iglicka, K. and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, M. (2010) EU Membership Highlights Poland's 
Migration Challenges. Migration Information Source,  September 1, 2010. 
Available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/eu-membership-highlights-
polands-migration-challenges Accessed: 20/07/2017 
International Organization for Migration (2016) Badanie na Temat Postaw Wobec 
Cudzoziemców w Polsce (English: Survey on the Attitudes towards Foreigners 
in Poland). Warszaw: Office for Foreign Affairs. 34-35.  
Kropp, M. and Striethorst, A. (2012) The Migrations of Roma in the European 
Union: An Ethnic Minority as the Sport of European Politics. Transform: 
European Network for Alternative Thinking and Political Dialogue.  
Available at: http://www.transform-network.net/yearbook/journal-
102012/news/detail/Journal/the-migrations-of-roma-in-the-european-union-an-
ethnic-minority-as-the-sport-of-european-politic.html Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Kóczé, A. (2017) Race, Migration and Neoliberalism: Distorted Notions of Romani 
Migration in European Public Discourses. Social Identities, 24(4): 459-473. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1335827  
  
 186  JOANNA KOSTKA 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 4(2): 169-188. 
Kozioł, M. (2014) Kradną, Obłapiają, Niszczą i nie są Biedni. Jak ‘Gazeta 
Wrocławska’ Szczuje na Romów (English: They Steal, Hassle, Destroy and Are 
Not Poor. How Daily Paper Harasses Roma). Gazeta Wyborcza, 7 July 2014. 
Available at: 
http://wyborcza.pl/1,76842,16280560,Kradna__oblapiaja__niszcza_i_nie_sa_bi
edni__Jak__Gazeta.html?disableRedirects=true Accessed: 20/07/2017  
Łodziński, S. and Szonert, M. (2016) Niepolityczna Polityka? Kształtowanie się 
Polityki Migracyjnej w Polsce w Latach 1989-2016 (English: Non-Political 
Politics? The Shaping of Politics of Migration in Poland between 1989-2016). 
Warsaw: Center of Migration Research, University of Warsaw. 
McGarry, A. (2017) Romaphobia: The Last Acceptable Form of Racism. Chicago: 
Zed Books. 
Marcinkowski, T. (ed.) (2015) Własnym Głosem o Sobie: Imigranci Romscy w Polsce 
(English: In their Own Voice: Romani Immigrants in Poland). Gorzów 
Wielkopolski: Zachodni Ośrodek Badań Społecznych i Ekonomicznych 
(Western Center for Social and Economic Research). 
Marcinkowski, T. and Rusakiewicz, M. (2015) Migracje Romskie i ich 
Uwarunkowania (English: Context of Roma Migration). In Marcinkowski, T. 
(ed.) Własnym Głosem o Sobie: Imigranci Romscy w Polsce (English: In their 
Own Voice: Romani Immigrants in Poland). Gorzów Wielkopolski: Zachodni 
Ośrodek Badań Społecznych i Ekonomicznych (Western Center for Social and 
Economic Research). 11-48. 
Móricz, I. (2013) An Overview of the Migration Policies and Trends – Hungary. 
Budapest: Center for Independent Journalism. Available at: 
http://migrationtothecentre.migraceonline.cz/en/an-overview-of-the-migration-
policies-and-trends-hungary Accessed: 20/07/2017  
Muižniek, N. (2015) Recognise Legal Capacity of All People with Disabilities. 
Strasbourg: Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights. Available 
at: http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/recognise-legal-capacity-of-all-
people-with-disabilities Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Nomada Association for Multicultural Society Integration (2013) Romanian Roma 
Community in Wroclaw. Report, December 19, 2013. Available 
at: http://nomada.info.pl/publikacje Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Nomada Association for Multicultural Society Integration (2014) Systemic Exclusion 
and Pathways to Integration: The Situation of the Romanian Roma Living in 
Wroclaw. Available at: http://nomada.info.pl/publikacje Accessed: 20/07/2017 
OECD (2016) Economic Survey of Poland. Towards an Innovative and Inclusive 
Economy. Warsaw: OECD Better Policies for Better Lives. Available 
at: http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/economic-survey-poland.htm  
Accessed: 20/07/2017  
 NO COUNTRY FOR POOR PEOPLE 187 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 4(2): 169-188. 
Okólski, M. (2004) Migration Patterns in Central and Eastern Europe on the Eve of 
the European Union Expansion: An Overview. In Górny, A. and Ruspini, P. 
(eds.) Migration in the New Europe. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillian. 23-47. 
O’Nions, H. (2011) Roma Expulsions and Discrimination: The Elephant in Brussels. 
European Journal of Migration and Law, 13(4): 361-388. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1163/157181611x605864  
Papadopoulos, D., Stephenson, N. and Tsianos, V. (2008) Escape Routes: Control 
and Subversion in the 21st Century. London: Pluto Press. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt183q4b2 
Parker, O. (2012). Roma and the Politics of EU Citizenship in France: Everyday 
Security and Resistance. Journal of Common Market Studies, 50(3): 475-491. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02238.x  
Severance, K. (2010) France's Expulsion of Roma Migrants: A Test Case for Europe. 
Brussels: Migration Policy Institute. Available at: 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/frances-expulsion-roma-migrants-test-
case-europe Accessed: 20/07/2017 
Sigona, N. and Trehan, N. (eds.) (2009) Romani Politics in Contemporary Europe: 
Poverty, Ethnic Mobilization, and the Neoliberal Order. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281165 
Sigona, N. and Vermeersch, P. (2012). Editors’ Introduction: The Roma in the New 
EU: Policies, Frames and Everyday Experiences. Journal of Ethnic and 
Migration Studies, 38(8): 1189–1193.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2012.689174 
Sowa, J. (2010) Mitologie III RP. Ideologiczne Podstawy Polskiej Transformacji. 
(English Mythologies of the Third Republic of Poland: Ideological Bases of the 
Polish Transformation). In Żuk, P. (ed.) Podziały Klasowe i Nierówności 
Społeczne. (English: Class Divisions and Social Inequalities). Warsaw: Oficyna 
Naukowa. 23-40. 
Stola, D. (2001) Poland. In Wallace, C. and Stola, D. (eds.) Patterns of Migration in 
Central Europe. Palgrave, London. 175-202.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333985519_8 
Tyler, I. (2013) Revolting Subjects: Social Abjection and Resistance in Neoliberal 
Britain. London: Zed Books.  
van Baar, H. (2017) Contained Mobility and the Racialization of Poverty in Europe: 
The Roma at the Development-Security Nexus. Social Identities, 24(4): 442-
458. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1335826 
Vermeersch, P. (2005). EU Enlargement and Immigration Policy in Poland and 
Slovakia. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 38(1): 71-88. DOI: 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.01.006 
 188  JOANNA KOSTKA 
INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 4(2): 169-188. 
Wacquant, L. (2012) The Punitive Regulation of Poverty in the Neoliberal Age. 
Criminal Justice Matters, 89(1): 38-40.  
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/09627251.2012.721980 
Webber, F. (2017) Shortcuts. London Review of Books, 39(7): 8-9.  
Weinar, A. (2005) Polityka Migracyjna Polski w Latach 1990-2003 – Próba 
Podsumowania (English: Polish Migration Policies between 1990-2003 – 
Assessment). Reports and Analysis. Warsaw: Center for International 
Relations. 
Yildiz, C. and De Genova, N. (2017) Un/Free mobility: Roma Migrants in the 
European Union. Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and 
Culture, 24(4): 425-441. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/13504630.2017.1335819 
Żuk, P. (2010) Realne Podziały i Pozorne Wspólnoty (English: Real Divisions and 
Surface Communities). In Żuk, P. (ed.) Podziały Klasowe i Nierówności 
Społeczne (English: Class Divisions and Social Inequalities). Warsaw: Oficyna 
Naukowa. 40-52. 
 
